The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality in Australia (NAP) was implemented in November 2000 when the John Howard government pledged $700 million towards the program. Another $700 million was pledged from the states and territories, making the total cost of the program add up to around $1.4 billion. This collaboration between the federal and state governments makes this program very unique compared to similar efforts involving just the funding from the federal government. The goal for the NAP over its 7 year period was:
- Motive and enable regional communities to use coordinated and targeted action to prevent, stabilize and reverse trends of dryland salinity affecting the sustainability of production,
- Conservation of biological diversity and the viability of infrastructure,
- Improve water quality and secure reliable allocations for humans uses, industry and the environment.
Figure 1: A graph showing the original planned usage of the budget and the actual expenditure. This graph used data from the ANAO survey. As the graph shows, the actual expenditure is much lower in the beginning of the program and peaks at a much later date than the planned peak. This may indicate that the rollout of the program was much slower than though and hit many problems.
Source: http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Uploads/Documents/2004%2005_
audit_report_17.pdf
The NAP rolled out mainly across the 21 priority regions that were found to be at most risk of dryland salinity in the National Dryland Salinity Program. Most of the regions were found in the Eastern section of Australia however most of the funding was allocated to New South Wales and Victoria as most areas within these states were heavily affected my dryland salinity as figure 3 shows. The projects were carried out by the regional Natural Resource Management (NRM) organisations using funding from the state and federal governments. The main organisation was Landcare Australia and it was involved in many projects around Australia. One such project involved the plantation 100,000 trees over a 2 year period and covered the Land Macquarie Landcare area, 50% of the trees survived. A lesson learnt during the plantation was the importance of encouraging people to plant trees.
Figure 4 represents all the results and conclusion of the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality in terms of salinity. It includes the response, community capacity, knowledge and innovation and the trade-offs to make the area sustainable. The report concluded by reporting: "With few exceptions the massive efforts involved in delivering NAPSWQ and NHT programs have at best halted the degradation of these resources. This has reinforced the view of the State of Environment (SoE) Report that concluded that the condition of these resources continues to decline despite the best efforts of the community and government". The report claimed that the actions taken during the program have halted the degradation of Australia's land.
Overall the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water quality succeeded in using the statistics from the previous National Dryland Salinity Program to create the 21 most at risk from salinity regions and applying some treatments to the areas. However the programs that were introduced mainly included the transferring of funds to Natural Resource Management groups which decreased the efficiency of the program, relative to the $1.4 billion funding from the state and federal government. As figure 1 shows, the rollout of the funding was much slower than anticipated due to the nature of the program and that most of the funds were distributed to different regional groups. Furthermore, the goal for the NAP included to "Motive and enable regional communities to use coordinated and targeted action to prevent, stabilize and reverse trends of dryland salinity affecting the sustainability of production" but most of the funding of the $1.4 billion did not go towards salinity because the cost of actually treating soil salinity is very high and for political reasons. The government that was elected after John Howard's government (Kevin Rudd's Government, a Labor Government) wished to separate itself from the actions of the Liberal government thus the money was reduced that was dedicated to treating salinity. The NAP failed to achieve the criteria set out due to these reasons.
Criteria: Were the programs that were introduced to combat soil salinity in Australia effective either through education or direct application of treatments. If not, what could have been done to improve the result.
While the NAP was successful enough to have a successor which is the National Landcare Program, there were many aspects of the program that needed improvement. Most of the budget for this program went towards paying farmers incentives to persuade them to utilize new desalinization treatments which was called 'small temporary grants' in the reports in hopes that they will adopt them permanently. This was a very inefficient and lazy method in hopes that they can apply treatments and provide education to the farmers. A better way to receive permission is by the advertising of the problem of salinity in Australia and it's effects on the economy and ecosystem. These advertisements should be targeted towards middle-aged people and farmers, thus pressure can be applied towards the political system and increase public awareness of the problem. A recommendation is television advertisements during prime time (etc, Q&A on ABC) or billboard posters on train stations. Advertising may increase the change that farmers acknowledge the effects of salinity on their farmlands thus give permission to allow treatments to be applied to the land. Advertising may cost more than incentives but it also allows the general public to learn about the problem.
Furthermore, due to the nature of the program, the funding was distributed to a variety of committees without a criteria of success. Therefore many of the projects that were carried out did not have an unified aim and this decreased the efficiency of the program. A recommendation for the current National Landcare Program is that before grands and funds are handed out, a set of criteria is handed out and the details of the project must be confirmed. This allows the projects to have a combined aim and thus increased efficiency with the available funds. The government have learnt lessons from the NAP and the successor (National Landcare Program) focused on a more asset-based approach and aimed to build a relationship between the government and farmers.
Another major problem was the restriction of the research of new treatments for soil salinity in Australia. While there are many solutions that can be currently used for the treatment such as planting salt-tolerant plants, they are all very time-consuming and expensive. The research and development of new methods that require less time and money is vital to ensure that more land holders are persuaded to act upon salinization. The House of Representatives review said that: "limited availability of commercially attractive treatment options for regions is a key risk that require(s) careful management". As figure 6 shows, Research and Development (R&D) only made up 7% of the total budget which was woeful compared to the amount of money spent as incentives for the farmers. The House of Representatives concluded in the review that the Australian Government "identify and remove impediments for catchment management organizations to undertake or commission research" . The Australian Government did not remove the restricts on the R&D budget in the NAP. If these recommendation were part of the program, the NAP would have been more successful with the budget that was allocated.
Another major problem was the restriction of the research of new treatments for soil salinity in Australia. While there are many solutions that can be currently used for the treatment such as planting salt-tolerant plants, they are all very time-consuming and expensive. The research and development of new methods that require less time and money is vital to ensure that more land holders are persuaded to act upon salinization. The House of Representatives review said that: "limited availability of commercially attractive treatment options for regions is a key risk that require(s) careful management". As figure 6 shows, Research and Development (R&D) only made up 7% of the total budget which was woeful compared to the amount of money spent as incentives for the farmers. The House of Representatives concluded in the review that the Australian Government "identify and remove impediments for catchment management organizations to undertake or commission research" . The Australian Government did not remove the restricts on the R&D budget in the NAP. If these recommendation were part of the program, the NAP would have been more successful with the budget that was allocated.